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THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: CONGRESS CON-
FRONTS THE EXECUTIVE. By Loch K Johnson. New York: New 
York University Press. 1984. Pp. xx, 206. $30. 
Since the first days of our Republic, Americans have faced the in-
tractable question of the proper balance of congressional and executive 
roles in the conduct of foreign affairs. The question is inherent in our 
constitutional system of checks and balances and raises difficult 
problems of how we as a nation can act effectively and coherently 
while still preserving democratic control over our foreign policy. It is 
an issue over which Congress and the President have differed many 
times in our history and has been the source of unending debate and 
discussion among political commentators and observers. It is to this 
important question that Professor Johnson 1 addresses himself in The 
Making of International Agreements: Congress Confronts the 
Executive. 
Johnson does not make a major substantive contribution to the dis-
cussion of congressional and executive roles in foreign affairs. Rather, 
in simple, succinct style, he provides students of international affairs 
with a helpful description of the making of international agreements 
by the United States. His work is intended to go beyond the superfi-
cial treatment given by many textbooks on U.S. foreign affairs in order 
to clarify the wide variety of techniques and objectives of formal diplo-
macy, and to explore the sharp disa~eements among policymakers and 
scholars concerning the proper executive-legislative balance in the mak-
ing of international agreements. [P. xvi.] 
Johnson's further purpose in this book is to advocate a larger role 
for Congress in the conduct of our foreign affairs. Our current foreign 
policy, he argues, suffers from an "institutional disequilibrium" and is 
characterized by a "freewheeling" executive and nonparticipative leg-
islature (pp. xvii-xviii). After briefly touching upon the complex 
problems associated with the democratic control of agreement mak-
ing, Johnson ends with some modest but practical suggestions to in-
crease congressional involvement in the making of foreign 
commitments. 
The most interesting and distinctive aspect of The Making of Inter-
national Agreements is the method Johnson has chosen to examine his 
topic. Unsatisfied with the arm-chair analyst's approach, Johnson 
gathered concrete data on which to base his analysis and discussion. 
He collected and analyzed almost 6000 bilateral, nonclassified interna-
tional agreements2 entered into by the United States from 1946 to 
1. Loch Johnson is professor of political science at the University of Georgia. He is a former 
staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
2. According to Johnson, 89% of America's agreements since 1946 have been bilateral agree-
ments. P. 49. Johnson gathered 5,991 such agreements from United States Statutes at Large, 
which lists international agreements prior to 1950, United States Treaties and Other International 
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1972.3 The result is welcome empirical groundwork for the consider-
ation of American agreement making. The firmer factual foundation, 
regrettably absent in many commentaries, sheds valuable new light on 
the question of balancing congressional and presidential involvement 
in foreign affairs. 
Johnson examines his data from several perspectives. One of these 
is the question of what sorts of countries have entered into agreements 
with the United States during the years 1946 to 1972. This inquiry 
provides some general conclusions about the character of our interna-
tional partnerships, but unfortunately Johnson's examination is short 
on specific, detailed analysis. For instance, he conceived only three 
abstract types of political regimes, democratic, authoritarian, and to-
talitarian, and tries to fit all countries into these analytical boxes. 
Moreover, he fails to list what countries fall into which category, or to 
provide any adequate definition or description of these amorphous cat-
egories. He says only: 
Democratic regimes are conceptualized as states where parties or groups 
compete for office in relatively free elections; authoritarian, or anticom-
munist "right-wing" regimes, as states where political power is in the 
hands of a single ruler, the military, or a civilian oligarchy without the 
benefit of free elections; and totalitarian, or communist "left-wing" re-
gimes, as states where the Communist party or a Marxist group holds 
the preponderance of political power within the society.4 
The reader is left wondering how accurate or objective Johnson's un-
stated classifications may be. Nevertheless, the broad picture con-
veyed by Johnson's data is interesting, even though imprecise and of 
little use for specific analysis or conclusions. The general picture is of 
a relative predominance of agreements with "democratic" regimes 
over agreements with either "authoritarian" or "totalitarian" regimes. 
It also seems a greater number of agreements were made with "author-
itarian" than with "totalitarian" regimes. This observation may mean 
little more than that the United States has had more ties with "right-
wing" than with "left-wing" countries - perhaps a foregone conclu-
sion considering that Johnson's sample of agreements is taken from 
the Cold War period. 
In a more useful avenue of analysis, Johnson examines his collec-
tion of agreements according to type of agreement and according to 
subject matter. He first conceives of three different types of agree-
Agreements, which lists all agreements entered into force after 1949, Treaties and Other Interna-
tional Acts Series, a set of numbered, pamphlet copies of international agreements, and the Digest 
of United States Practice In International Law. These compilations are all published by the U.S. 
Government Printing Office. P. 8 n.12. 
3. In a footnote Johnson writes that the years 1946 through 1972 were analyzed because they 
mark the limits of the Cold War period. P. 8 n.13. However, nowhere in the book does Johnson 
limit his conclusions to Cold War international politics or to those conditions which characterize 
a Cold War foreign policy. 
4. P. 32 (footnote omitted). 
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ments and categorizes all the agreements into these general classes. 
There are (1) agreements based in whole or in part upon the constitu-
tional authority and power of the President, termed "executive agree-
ments," (2) agreements made strictly pursuant to congressional 
legislation, termed "statutory agreements," and (3) agreements made 
according to the treaty process under article II, section 2, of the Con-
stitution, termed simply "treaties."5 He then classifies each agreement 
according to its general subject matter: (1) military; (2) economic; (3) 
cultural-technical (including health and education); ( 4) transporta-
tion-communications; or (5) diplomatic (including passports, claims, 
and war claims). 
In analyzing the agreements according to their subject matter, 
Johnson discovered a consistently greater number of economic agree-
ments than any other. Economic agreements accounted for thirty-
seven percent of all the agreements from 1946 through 1972 (p. 15). 
They were the most prevalent international agreement in every presi-
dential administration except Truman's, in which cultural-technical 
agreements surpassed economic ones. Cultural-technical agreements 
were the second most common sort of agreement during this period, 
followed by military agreements (p. 17). Transportation, communica-
tion, and diplomatic agreements were the least frequent during this 
period (p. 18). 
The clearest and most compelling conclusion from all of Johnson's 
research and analysis is revealed in his classifications of agreements 
according to their type. Johnson found that his second category of 
agreements, the statutory agreements, were the overwhelmingly pre-
dominant form of international agreement utilized by the United 
States during this period. Almost eighty-seven percent of all the 
agreements between 1946 to 1972 were statutory agreements. The 
statutory agreement was the most common form of agreement in every 
subject matter area (p. 19). The predominance of this form of agree-
ment held true in each year of every presidential administration during 
this period. At its lowest, the proportion of statutory agreements 
among total international agreements in any one year was still sixty-
seven percent. The proportion went as high as ninty-five percent in 
1962 (p. 13). 
If only because of the sheer number of statutory agreements, one 
might have expected Johnson to concentrate his analysis on this form 
of agreement. He does not. Instead Johnson focuses on executive 
agreements, even though they accounted for only 7.4% of all the 
agreements made between 1946 through 1972 (p. 13). One suspects 
5. In making these classifications, Johnson relied heavily upon a Department of State publi-
cation, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OTHER THAN TREATIES, 1946-1968: A LIST WITH CI-
TATION OF THEIR LEGAL BASIS (1969), and its updating supplements. For some agreements he 
also relied upon telephone interviews with the Office of the Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs. P. 8 
n.14. 
972 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:965 
this emphasis is a reflection of Professor Johnson's personal view on 
the proper roles of Congress and th~ President in international affairs, 
a view unaffected by the force of his own empirical findings. Johnson 
seems entrenched in his perception of "freewheeling executive discre-
tion in the making of international agreements" (p. xviii), notwith-
standing the predominant number of agreements made strictly 
pursuant to congressional authorization. It is his thesis, he says, that 
although the Congress has participated in the making of many interna-
tional agreements, major commitments - especially in the military and 
intelligence areas - have been decided by the President alone or, worse 
still, by non-elected officials in the executive branch. [P. 158.] 
Attempting to explain the inconsistency between his position and 
the empirical findings, Johnson argues that those many statutory 
agreements indicate only a procedural involvement of Congress. 6 He 
writes that 
earlier studies, as well as the author's own interviews and observations, 
suggest that the legislative branch is often deficient in the substantive 
area - the meaningful details of policy - despite its considerable proce-
dural involvement in the approval of international commitments. 7 
However, the one and only "earlier study" Johnson cites, Theodore J. 
Lowi, The End of Liberalism, 8 does not establish that those statutory 
agreements--were merely procedural rubber stamps or that Congress 
was just giving the "official green light" to the executive (p. 26). Nor 
do the author's private interviews with unknown persons or his per-
sonal, unelaborate9 observations support the assertion that Congress 
has had no substantive role in the making of international agreements. 
Despite his attempts, Johnson simply fails to show the irrelevance of 
his own clearest empirical finding.9 
It is the "normative theme" of this book, Johnson says, "that for-
eign policy should be conducted on the basis of a partnership between 
the executive and legislative branches" (p. xviii). That is a fine plati-
6. Johnson's attempt to distinguish procedure and substance, and to characterize a proce-
dural role as somehow insignificant, is highly problematic. A procedural requirement can be the 
source of considerable power and influence, and may significantly affect so-called substantive 
matters. The most obvious example is the procedural requirement of Senate approval in treaty 
making. This constitutional procedural requirement gives the Senate significant influence to 
shape a treaty, as well as the power to reject a treaty. 
7. P. 26 (footnote omitted). 
8. T. LoWJ, THE END OF LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1979). 
9. The reader also should be aware that (intentionally or not) Johnson's classification of types 
of agreements maximizes the number of executive agreements while minimizing the number of 
statutory agreements. He counted any agreement based in whole or in part upon the constitu-
tional authority of the President only as an executive agreement. Thus, even if an agreement was 
made pursuant to congressional enactment, the invocation of the constitutional authority of the 
executive brought it out of the statutory agreement class and into the executive agreement class. 
P. 8. Of course this creates a statistical bias in favor of executive agreements and against statu-
tory agreements. Therefore, the high number of statutory agreements reported by Johnson is 
probably even higher in reality, while the number of executive agreements may be overstated. 
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tude, but the real issue is the balance of power between Congress and 
the President within that partnership. Johnson obviously believes that 
Congress has not had enough power in the past and that the balance 
should shift in Congress' favor. He even proposes some interesting, 
specific ideas on how to further that end. 10 In his zeal to make the 
case for a greater congressional role, however, Johnson has overlooked 
a promising, largely unexplored possibility for achieving a properly 
balanced foreign policy partnership: the statutory agreement. The 
statutory agreement is a flexible form of international agreement, ca-
pable of incorporating and accommodating both Congress and the 
President in the conduct of foreign affairs. 11 The already wide use of 
the statutory agreement evidenced by Johnson's data means that it 
would likely face fewer obstacles as the vehicle for a balanced foreign 
policy partnership. Moreover, Congress' control of the purse strings 
would guarantee it the opportunity for a significant role in the making 
of international agreements, notwithstanding Johnson's assertions to 
the contrary. Thus, the statutory agreement holds interesting and 
promising potential for the management and maintenance of the for-
eign policy partnership between Congress and the President. It is dis-
appointing, then, that The Making of International Agreements 
devotes so little attention to this instrument of foreign affairs, espe-
cially after pointing out its impressive empirical significance. 
10. Johnson recommends: (1) a computerized storage and access system for this information 
so Congress can monitor more effectively the making of international agreements; (2) notification 
to Congress of all international agreements and their substance before they are supposed to be-
come effective; (3) sample audits of the type and extent of United States' agreements with differ-
ent countries to insure complete and accurate reporting by the executive; (4) upgraded record-
keeping and reporting standards within the executive; and (5) a comprehensive legislative review 
of the procedure for making agreements. Pp. 164-73. 
11. One of Johnson's own case studies shows the great capacity of the statutory agreement to 
accommodate both branches of government in their competing interests. In September 1975, the 
United States, Israel, and Egypt entered into the Sinai Agreements. These agreements, among 
other things, provided for the participation of American technicians in an early warning defense 
system to be established between the forces of Israel and Egypt. Congress objected to this agree-
ment, arguing that an agreement placing Americans in a potential war zone required a treaty and 
not merely the President's executive agreement. Ultimately, the dispute was settled between the 
two branches by the compromise of using a statutory agreement. Johnson writes: "What some 
wanted to be a treaty and others an executive agreement finally became a statutory agreement in 
order for the Congress to give its approval to the commitment." P. 162. In this way, both 
branches were involved in the agreement in a genuine, balanced partnership. 
